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I.  INTRODUCTION 
It’s recently become fashionable to study the intersection of 
international and constitutional law.  For scholars of domestic 
constitutions, the rise of globalization, the trend toward democratic 
governance, and the creation of a robust case law by international 
tribunals have magnified the attractions of comparative constitutional 
inquiry.  The study of foreign and international exemplars provides a 
source for domestic innovation and a window through which to view 
one’s own constitutional heritage refracted through a lens of 
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difference.1  The use of foreign and international law as sources for 
constitutional drafting by legislators or interpretation by judges is 
often contested.  But a comparative gaze can, at a minimum, reveal 
paths not taken and arguments not advanced at home, even if the 
comparison ultimately leads to a reaffirmation of domestic first 
principles.2 
For scholars of international law, the appeal of constitutions and 
the discourse of constitutionalism has a much more urgent character, 
one driven by major changes to the international legal system.  
International agreements and institutions are proliferating rapidly, 
driven by a recognition that the problems governments now 
confront—environmental degradation, security threats, economic 
growth, human rights, and many others—can no longer be addressed 
by the exercise of authority confined within increasingly porous 
national borders.3  As intergovernmental cooperation has become 
essential to national and global well-being, states have found it 
necessary to pool or limit their sovereignty, drafting treaties that set 
out rules for their collaborative endeavors and create institutions to 
 
 1. See generally VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999) (analyzing constitutional approaches in different 
national jurisdictions). 
 2. Compare, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003) 
(holding that state sodomy laws criminalizing sexual conduct between 
consenting adults of the same sex violates the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution and citing—as persuasive evidence of “values we 
share with a wider civilization”—the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights which held similar laws in Europe to be incompatible with the 
right of privacy), with id. at 2495  (“The Court’s discussion of these foreign 
views . . . is . . . meaningless dicta.  Dangerous dicta, however, since ‘this 
Court[] . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on 
Americans.’”) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 
990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).  See also Laurence R. Helfer, Not 
Leading the World but Following It, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2003, at A25 
(stating that the United States has fallen behind other countries in protecting 
the rights of lesbians and gay men and predicting that the Supreme Court 
would take global trends into account in Lawrence). 
 3. See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial 
Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709 (1999) 
(discussing the expanding number of international tribunals); Eric Stein, 
International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 489, 489 n.2 (2001) (noting that the number of intergovernmental 
organizations more than doubled in the last half of the twentieth century). 
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help police those rules.4  Many of these treaties and institutions—
what international relations (IR) scholars collectively refer to as 
international “regimes”5—now exert significant influence on 
domestic law and politics.  What legal frameworks are needed to 
address this tectonic shift in international relations?  Settled doctrines 
of international law provide an important starting point, establishing 
basic ground rules for the negotiation, interpretation, and termination 
of treaties and the responsibility of states for violating their legal 
obligations.6  But many of these doctrines were formulated at a time 
when international law’s primary focus was mediating the 
interactions among sovereign nations whose domestic actions were 
largely immune from scrutiny.  This focus did not lend itself to deep 
comparisons with national legal structures, constitutional or 
otherwise.  Nor did it accurately reflect the reality of a world in 
which governments possess very different material resources, 
interests, and political configurations and interact not only with each 
 
 4. Contrary to the exaggerated fears (or hopes) of some observers, these 
agreements and institutions have not usurped nation states as the principal 
actors on the international stage.  Rather, they serve state interests by reducing 
transactions costs, increasing access to information, monitoring behavior, 
mediating disputes, and using incentives and sanctions to induce compliance 
with prior commitments.  See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why 
States Act Through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 3, 8 (1998); William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and 
International Legal Scholarship, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 227, 243–56 
(1997).  The only plausible exception has occurred in Europe, where the 
agreements and institutions of the European Union have progressed to a hybrid 
“supranational” status that lies midway between a classical intergovernmental 
institution and a full-fledged federal system.  See infra Part II. 
 5. The canonical (if sometimes criticized) definition of regimes are “sets 
of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations.”  STEPHEN D. KRASNER, Structural Causes and Regime 
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables 1, 2, in INTERNATIONAL 
REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); see also Stephan Haggard & Beth A. 
Simmons, Theories of International Regimes, 41 INT’L ORG. 491, 493–96 
(1987) (discussing three definitions of regimes). 
 6. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, 
TEXT AND COMMENTARIES (James Crawford ed., 2002). 
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other but with private individuals and civic networks operating 
within and across national borders. 
Precisely because international rules and institutions are now 
more pervasive, more consequential, and penetrate further into 
domestic affairs, they raise normative and conceptual challenges that 
international lawyers of an earlier age were not forced to confront.  
As a preliminary example, consider the legitimacy of a state’s 
compliance with its treaty commitments.  The law of treaties 
addresses legitimacy by specifying the formal indicia of a state’s 
consent to a treaty, such as the signature and ratification of the 
authoritative text by a government official with power to bind her 
government.7  Once these rules of adherence have been followed, 
compliance is a straightforward matter.8  The principle of pacta sunt 
servanda (treaty commitments must be obeyed) compels the state to 
adhere to its obligations.9  Because those obligations were 
undertaken with the state’s consent, the reasoning goes, no 
legitimacy concerns arise.10 
But consider what lies beneath the surface of this narrative.  It 
assumes that treaty obligations, once undertaken, remain static.  In 
fact, governments often leave agreements imprecise or incomplete, to 
be clarified and augmented by later state practice.11  The narrative 
 
 7. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, arts. 6-16, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 334–36. 
 8. One narrow exception is rebus sic stantibus, a doctrine that permits a 
state, within carefully prescribed limits, to invoke changed circumstances as a 
justification for failing to adhere to the state’s prior treaty obligations.  See 
Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 62, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347 (setting forth 
the doctrine and its limitations).  For an insightful discussion of the history of 
the doctrine and its tension with the principle of pacta sunt servanda, see 
David J. Bederman, The 1871 London Declaration, Rebus Sic Stantibus and a 
Primitivist View of the Law of Nations, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1988). 
 9. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339 (“Every 
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them 
in good faith.”). 
 10. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A 
Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 
596, 597 (1999) (“In international law, the strongly consensualist basis of 
obligation has tended to moot the issue of legitimacy.”). 
 11. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in 
International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000) (explaining advantages 
and disadvantages of using binding and nonbinding commitments and 
objectives to structure international relations among states); Joel P. Trachtman, 
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also ignores the role of international institutions, many of which are 
granted the authority to monitor behavior, settle disputes among 
treaty parties, interpret ambiguous texts, and develop new hard and 
soft law norms.12  Where treaty obligations are dynamic and evolve 
through institutional processes outside of any one state’s control, 
compliance with those obligations may clash with domestic 
preferences and raise trenchant legitimacy concerns.  The formal 
rules of state consent to treaties do little to ameliorate these concerns, 
suggesting the need for alternative sources of legitimacy to support 
adherence to international agreements and institutions.13 
The foregoing example illustrates how the maturation of the 
international legal system is challenging settled doctrines and 
prompting scholars to assess the system from fresh perspectives.  
One such perspective is to view international rules and institutions 
through the lens of constitutionalism.14  On first inspection, the 
parallels between international and constitutional law seem both 
numerous and compelling:  Which international norms, for example, 
should be granted the status of higher law and given a privileged 
place above ordinary legal rules?  What is the appropriate balance of 
power among international institutions, such as the lawmaking and 
adjudicative arms of the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the 
many agencies of the United Nations (UN)?  When should those 
institutions defer to the decisions of other actors in the system, such 
 
The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 333 (1999) 
(arguing that states may deliberately choose to leave treaty texts incomplete to 
be filled in by subsequent international adjudication). 
 12. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 4, at 8.  For a recent example of an 
intergovernmental organization being granted new authority, see Lawrence K. 
Altman, W.H.O. Expected to Gain Broader Powers, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 
2003, at A11. 
 13. For a more detailed discussion of democracy and legitimacy, see infra 
Part VII. 
 14. See, e.g., DANIEL J. ELAZAR, CONSTITUTIONALIZING GLOBALIZATION: 
THE POSTMODERN REVIVAL OF CONFEDERAL AGREEMENTS (1998); ERNST-
ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1991); see also Deborah Z. 
Cass, The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-
Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International 
Trade, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 39, 40–41, 40 n.3 (2001) (discussing different 
meanings of “constitutionalization” by a variety of commentators). 
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as national courts, parliaments, or executive officials?  And to what 
extent should autonomous international tribunals exercise their 
limited authority to hold states to their treaty bargains when those 
bargains run counter to immediate political pressures? 
These questions are remarkably similar to those posed by 
constitutional law scholars, and they suggest fruitful areas of 
scholarly inquiry.  But conceptualizing the international legal system 
in constitutional terms is not without pitfalls.  It requires more than 
merely identifying successful domestic constitutional responses and 
transposing them mutatis mutandis to international governance 
structures.  The many profound differences between domestic and 
international legal systems—including not least the lack of a global 
polity to authorize the creation of constitutional norms and structures 
above the level of the nation state—require a more careful and 
guarded appraisal. 
Bearing these caveats in mind, in the remainder of this Article I 
consider constitutional analogies in greater detail.  In particular, I 
review five key structural and systemic challenges that the 
international legal system now faces:  (1) decentralization and 
disaggregation; (2) normative and institutional hierarchies; (3) 
compliance and enforcement; (4) exit and escape; and (5) democracy 
and legitimacy.  Each of these five issues raises questions of 
governance, institutional design, and allocation of authority, many of 
which are comparable to questions that domestic legal systems have 
answered through constitutions.  For each issue, I survey the 
international legal landscape and consider the salience of potential 
analogies to domestic constitutions, drawing upon and extending the 
writings of international legal scholars and international relations 
theorists. 
My objectives are deliberately modest.  I do not intend to offer 
prescriptions for reforming international agreements or 
intergovernmental organizations along constitutional lines.  Rather, I 
offer some preliminary thoughts about why some treaties and 
institutions, but not others, more readily lend themselves to analysis 
in constitutional terms.  I also hope to distinguish those legal and 
political issues that may generate useful insights for scholars 
studying the growing intersections of international and constitutional 
law from other areas that may be more resistant to constitutional 
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comparisons.  Before turning to a point by point discussion of the 
five structural and systemic issues, I begin with a brief historical 
overview of two treaty-based intergovernmental organizations that 
have evolved to most closely resemble domestic constitutional 
systems. 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL BEGINNINGS:  FROM THE EU TO THE WTO 
The story behind the recent turn to constitutional discourse in 
international affairs began in Europe in the middle of the last 
century.  The institutions of the European Community (now the 
European Union, or EU) were created by the Treaty of Rome, an 
international agreement among six Western European countries that 
resembled many other multilateral treaties negotiated among 
sovereign nation states.15  Over a few short decades, these European 
institutions transformed the treaty—and themselves—into something 
far different.  As is now well known, the EU evolved into a quasi-
federal system with legislative, judicial, and executive branches that 
exercise significant lawmaking, adjudicative, and enforcement 
powers over first six, then fifteen, and now twenty-five European 
member states.16 
The ambitious architect of this transformation was the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ).17  The judges on the court understood that 
their rulings would have little impact if their docket was limited to 
occasional disputes between member states.  To avoid falling into 
obscurity, the court took advantage of a little known provision in the 
Treaty of Rome allowing national courts to refer cases to the ECJ for 
 
 15. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]; see J.H.H. Weiler, The 
Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991). 
 16. See J.H.H. Weiler & Joel P. Trachtman, European Constitutionalism 
and its Discontents, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 354, 356 (1996–1997) 
(discussing the shift of the European Community “from a legal order founded 
by international treaties negotiated by the governments of states under 
international law and giving birth to an international organization, to a 
Community which has evolved and behaves as if its founding instrument were 
not a treaty governed by international law but . . . a constitutional charter 
governed by a form of constitutional law.”). 
 17. For a more detailed discussion of the ECJ, see Laurence R. Helfer & 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 290–93 (1997). 
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a preliminary ruling on European Community law.  When domestic 
judges began to refer cases, the court used a teleological method of 
treaty interpretation18 to proclaim the doctrines of direct effect, 
supremacy, preemption, and implied powers.19  These doctrines—
which have direct analogues in domestic constitutional 
jurisprudence—bolstered the authority of the European Community’s 
legislative and executive arms and made the ECJ’s own judgments 
nearly as effective as those of national courts.20  In short order, both 
the court and the scholars and lawyers who had observed its 
evolution proclaimed that the Treaty of Rome was now “the basic 
constitutional charter” of the European Community.21  By 2002, this 
remarkable trajectory had accelerated to the point where delegates 
from all of the EU’s member states were debating a new Convention 
on the Future of Europe, a document that many observers hoped 
would “replace the EU’s complex web of constitutive treaties with a 
definitive constitution.”22 
Could this “constitutionalization” of international law and 
institutions be replicated elsewhere?  The prospects for successful 
imitation at first seemed bleak.  International courts and tribunals, 
 
 18. The “telos” or goal of the Court’s doctrinal handiwork was to facilitate 
the Treaty of Rome’s paramount objective of an “ever closer union” among the 
member states.  Treaty of Rome, supra note 15, pmbl., 298 U.N.T.S. at 14. 
 19. For a discussion of these doctrines, see Weiler, supra note 15, at 2413–
17. 
 20. See Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: 
Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 681, 716 (1996–1997) 
(“[T]he Court of Justice has both displayed a tendency toward self-
aggrandizement and has supported an expansion of the authority of the EU 
organs at the expense of national lawmaking authority.”). 
 21. See Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. Parliament, 1986 ECR 1339, 1365 
(describing the Treaty of Rome as “the basic constitutional charter” of the 
Community); J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO THE NEW 
CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?” AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION 221 (1999) (“The constitutionalism thesis claims that in critical 
aspects the [European] Community has evolved and behaves as if its founding 
instrument were not a treaty governed by international law but, to use the 
language of the European Court, a constitutional charter governed by a form of 
constitutional law.”). 
 22. Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European 
Union: Some Cautionary Tales From American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1612, 1614 n.3 (2002). 
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thought by many observers to be essential for effective constitution 
building beyond national borders, were weak and underutilized 
outside of Europe.  Some were, in truth, only quasi-judicial bodies 
that lacked the basic power to issue legally binding decisions and 
instead operated entirely by persuasion.  Even tribunals that enjoyed 
greater formal authority were hobbled by limited jurisdictional 
mandates, empty dockets, or narrow subject-matter competencies 
that made judicial constitution building a political and practical 
impossibility.23  Yet, the powerful example of European 
constitutionalism remained, suggesting that “a conventional treaty 
regime, once endowed with a judicial mechanism for interpretation 
and enforcement, can be converted by degrees to a genuine 
constitutional order.”24 
The dim prospects for international constitutionalism brightened 
in the mid-1990s with the creation of the World Trade 
Organization.25  The WTO is the successor to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and incorporates the substantive 
obligations of that earlier treaty.26  But the WTO also contains key 
institutional innovations that scholars quickly interpreted as 
containing the seeds of a proto-constitution.  First, the WTO 
endorses a legalistic approach to resolving international trade 
disputes,27 creating ad hoc dispute settlement panels and a standing 
 
 23. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 17, at 285–86. 
 24. Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Legitimacy and Global 
Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO Is a Step Too Far 227, 239, in 
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING 
SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 227, 239 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001) 
[hereinafter EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY]. 
 25. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1140 (1994), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/03-fa_e.htm [hereinafter Final 
Act]. 
 26. The subject matter of the WTO Agreements includes far more than the 
tariff and nontariff barriers of the GATT.  It also extends to trade in services, 
intellectual property, agriculture, and detailed rules concerning government 
procurement, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, antidumping, subsidies, and 
countervailing duties.  Stein, supra note 3, at 500 n.60. 
 27. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional 
Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 477, 479–83 (1994); G. Richard 
Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the 
World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 833–34 (1995). 
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tribunal of trade experts known to hear appeals from panel rulings.  
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding refers to this tribunal 
by the politically palatable euphemism of “Appellate Body.”  But it 
has been clear from the outset that, whatever its formal appellation, 
this judicial dispute settlement institution would function as a de 
facto court of international trade.  WTO panels and the Appellate 
Body have issued dozens of rulings each year in contentious cases 
between WTO member states involving high financial stakes and 
difficult questions of treaty interpretation that cut to the core of 
domestic regulation.  WTO jurists, in short, have begun to perform 
“functions somewhat like a constitutional court elaborating the 
meaning and import of a fairly fixed primary text.”28 
Second, in a manner analogous to domestic constitutions, the 
WTO treaties have acquired something of the status of higher law—
at least when that law clashes with inconsistent national legislation or 
regulations.  The system’s robust dispute settlement mechanism 
further entrenches the perception that “WTO rules act as a super-
constitutional text with a force superior to ordinary national 
enactments.”29  After losing before a panel or the Appellate Body, 
defending member states are expected to bring their inconsistent 
measures into conformity with the treaty.  Those that fail to do so 
face the threat of authorized retaliation in the form of trade sanctions, 
giving all governments—including those of economically powerful 
states—a strong incentive to comply. 
A third characteristic that buttresses WTO’s incipient 
constitutional character is its de facto separation of international 
trade from ordinary domestic politics.  The organization (like the 
GATT before it) was premised on a club model of multilateral 
cooperation.30  The members of the club were trade ministers, 
initially from a relatively small number of like-minded industrialized 
states, who met in closed door sessions and then presented the results 
 
 28. Jeffery Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 
451, 458 (2001); see also Cass, supra note 14, at 42–71 (discussing 
constitutional functions performed by the WTO Appellate Body). 
 29. Atik, supra note 28, at 452. 
 30. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Club Model of 
Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in 
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY, supra note 24, at 264. 
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of their negotiations to largely uninformed and unchallenging 
domestic constituencies.  This approach facilitated deeper integration 
by “limiting the disruptive force of parochial concerns emanating 
from domestic politics.”31  But the broader effect was to disengage 
trade norms from national political structures and national polities, 
transforming the character of the WTO Agreements “from that of a 
complex, messy negotiated bargain of diverse rules, principles, and 
norms into a single structure” whose elements were far more difficult 
to contest.32 
Other features of the WTO, however, suggest that these 
constitutional attributes are far less entrenched than in the EU.  For 
one thing, the treaties under the organization’s umbrella do not create 
private rights to be given direct effect before domestic courts.  Only 
member states have rights and obligations under the WTO 
agreements.33  In addition, the detailed thicket of trade rules applies 
not merely (as in Europe) to a regionally contiguous cluster of 
countries with similar economies and levels of industrialization, but 
to a truly global association of states whose economies range from 
the most to the least developed.34  Having so many issues and so 
many nations seated at the bargaining table increases the opportunity 
for package deals.  But these same features also make it far more 
difficult to reach consensus on a set of constitutional meta norms to 
govern the organization and its members.  Finally, the WTO’s 
dispute settlement jurists have adopted a more circumspect 
interpretive approach than their European colleagues.  Where the 
ECJ has used an openly teleological method to forge the support 
beams that were missing from the EU’s constitutional frame, the 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body have acted as comparatively 
 
 31. Id. at 266. 
 32. Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 24, at 228. 
 33. See WTO Dispute Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of 
the Trade Act of 1974, WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R ¶¶ 7.76-7.78 (Dec. 22, 1999) 
(WTO panel stated that, unlike the EU, the WTO had only “indirect effect” on 
“individual economic operators” and did not create a new legal order that 
comprised both member states and their nationals). 
 34. See Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the 
TRIPs Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 357, 389–92 (1998) [hereinafter Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright 
Claims] (discussing differences in membership between EU and WTO). 
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strict constructionists.  Taking their cue from the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding which prohibits “add[ing] to or diminish[ing] the 
rights and obligations” in the treaties,35 the trade jurists have 
conceived of their role as enforcers of the bargains negotiated by the 
member states rather than as creative builders who can fill in 
constitutional gaps in the treaty’s architecture.36 
The foregoing discussion reveals that the WTO’s constitutional 
attributes are only partial and incomplete.  But the cumulative effect 
of those features has been sufficient to create a fully functioning and 
effective system of international trade.  Indeed, so successful is the 
WTO as an intergovernmental organization that some commentators 
have advocated adding still more international law issues within its 
purview—including environmental protection, labor standards, and 
human rights—notwithstanding the fact that each of these subjects is 
already governed by its own set of treaties and institutions.37  Other 
scholars have warned against these incorporation efforts, however, 
contending that dyeing these legal issues with a tincture of trade 
 
 35. General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade—Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations (the Uruguay Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15, 1994, art. 3.2, Annex 2, 33 
I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding]. 
 36. See Atik, supra note 28, at 458 (“When common and political sense 
might have suggested straying from the text, WTO decisions have often held 
close to the letter of the law while expressing reluctance about the holding.”); 
Stein, supra note 3, at 502 (“There is no indication . . . that the dispute 
settlement organs will be able or willing to ‘constitutionalize’ the basic [WTO] 
agreements in the image of the crucial role that the [ECJ] has played in 
European integration.”). But see John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of 
Conflicts Between Trade and the Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 
(forthcoming Winter 2004, manuscript at 51–80, on file with author). 
 37. For discussions of the merits and demerits of incorporating each of 
these issue areas into the WTO, see Robert Howse, The World Trade 
Organization and the Protection of Workers’ Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING 
BUS. L. 131, 134–35 (1999); Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade 
Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of the 
WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1, 84–90 (2001); Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an 
Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition to 
the World Trade Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 40–45 
(1996). 
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would leave an indelible stain.38  Many WTO members themselves 
have protested the linkage to non-trade issues, arguing that it would 
give unfair economic advantages to some nations (mainly wealthy 
industrialized ones) at the expense of others (mainly poorer 
developing countries).  But the very fact that governments and 
observers are giving vent to such expansionist proposals reveals the 
degree to which the WTO has, in only a few short years, 
demonstrated its present efficacy and its future potential to evolve 
into an international institution with aspirations to constitutional 
authority.39 
III.  DECENTRALIZATION AND DISAGGREGATION 
Seen from the perspective of encouraging states to comply with 
their treaty obligations, the EU and the WTO are unadulterated 
success stories.  But it would be wrong for readers unfamiliar with 
international politics to conclude that these intergovernmental 
organizations are representative of the international legal system as a 
whole.  Quite to the contrary, these two institutions are exceptional 
cases and for that reason are often viewed with envy by lawyers and 
scholars whose work focuses on weaker or less effective 
international regimes or treaties with poor compliance records.40 
 
 38. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 733, 756 (1999); J. Patrick Kelly, The WTO and Global Governance: 
The Case for Contractual Treaty Regimes, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 109, 128–
31 (2001). 
 39. See Daniel C. Esty, Comment, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND 
LEGITIMACY, supra note 24, at 301, 304 (referring to the failed attempt to 
launch the Millennium Round of trade negotiations in Seattle in 1999 as “the 
opening of a Global Constitutional Convention” that will “involve decades or 
even centuries of discussions and refinements”). 
 40. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, How Not to Link: Institutional Conundrums 
of an Expanded Trade Regime, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 1 (2001) (“Whatever 
its flaws, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the envy of international 
lawyers who are more familiar with less efficient and more compliance-
resistant legal regimes, including those within the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), United Nations (UN) human rights bodies, and other 
adjudicative arrangements such as the World Court or the ad hoc war crimes 
tribunals.”). 
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Anarchy is the principal reason why robust international 
institutions and governance structures have been slow to develop.41  
There is no single legislative, executive, or judicial body with 
mandatory, universal authority over all subjects denominated as 
“international,” in the way that a national parliament can regulate all 
aspects of domestic law.42  A few important institutions, such as the 
UN Charter and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), are 
empowered to resolve a broad range of controversies.  But even these 
entities are significantly limited when compared to domestic 
legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies.43 
In the absence of a centralized, hierarchical authority with the 
power to coerce behavior, nation states are free to pursue their own 
interests, with states that possess more material or financial resources 
often enjoying a decided advantage in their relations with weaker or 
poorer countries.44  But operating under anarchic conditions is costly, 
time consuming, and inefficient, even for powerful states.  These 
negative byproducts of anarchy create incentives for states to achieve 
more productive outcomes by negotiating treaties and participating in 
international governance structures.  Yet, because the incentive to 
cooperate varies with factors such as information asymmetries, 
power imbalances, differentiated applicability rules, and the nature of 
 
 41. See, e.g., Robert Axelrod & Robert O. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation 
Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, 38 WORLD POL. 226 (1985); JACK 
DONNELLY, REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 9 (2000). 
 42. See José E. Alvarez, Constitutional Interpretation in International 
Organizations 104, 106–07, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001). 
 43. In the case of the ICJ, a state must expressly consent to the Court’s 
jurisdiction.  In the absence of such consent, the Court has no power to hear a 
dispute.  See ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY 30 (1999).  The authority of the United Nations is broader, but still 
does not reach all nations or all legal issues.  See Elizabeth Olson, Slim Edge 
Mars Vote by Swiss To Join U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, at A8.  In 
addition, the Charter contains important subject-matter carve-outs, such as the 
domestic jurisdiction exclusion in Article 2(7), although these have eroded 
significantly over time.  See Alvarez, supra note 42, at 107. 
 44. See Jonathan D. Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1789, 1793–96 (2003) (discussing the importance of anarchy and power 
in international politics). 
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the underlying problem to be resolved,45 no one mode of 
cooperation, institutional format, or even type of law has 
predominated.46 
The result is a disaggregated and decentralized international 
legal system,47 comprised of a hodge podge of rules and institutions 
that includes tens of thousands of multilateral, regional, and bilateral 
treaties;48 myriad nonbinding soft law norms; intergovernmental 
organizations; standard setting bodies; courts, tribunals and arbitral 
panels; and formal and informal government, private, and hybrid 
networks.49  To the uninitiated, the number and diversity of these 
 
 45. Id. at 1797–98 (discussing “difficulties associated with ‘prisoner’s 
dilemmas’ (especially the risk of cheating), coordination problems, 
asymmetrical information, transaction costs, free riding, the ‘tragedy of the 
commons,’ and other challenges to collective action”); Kal Raustiala, 
Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401, 407 (2000) 
(identifying instances where international environmental agreements impose 
“differential regulatory obligations” on developed and developing states). 
 46. The term “international” is inadequate to convey the richness and 
complexity of the legal rules and structures now operating outside or alongside 
of national legal systems, prompting observers to coin such terms as 
“supranational,” “anational,” and “non-national.”  See Laurence R. Helfer & 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the 
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
141, 145 (2001). 
 47. See Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. 
L. REV. 288, 301 (1999) (using these terms to describe the international human 
rights petition system) [hereinafter Helfer, Forum Shopping]. 
 48. See United Nations Treaty Collection: Overview, at 
http://untreaty.un.org/English/overview.asp (last visited Aug. 20, 2003) 
(stating that the United Nations Treaty Series, a collection of international 
agreements registered or recorded with the UN Secretariat since 1946, contains 
over 50,000 treaties). 
 49. See, e.g., Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 46, at 144–45 nn. 1–5 (“The 
number of [lawmaking and dispute settlement] institutions operating outside 
the confines of national borders have become more numerous and 
heterogeneous in the last decades of the twentieth century. Indeed, their growth 
appears exponential.”); Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the 
International System, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-
BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, 22, 25–31 (Dinah 
Shelton ed., 2000) (discussing different forms of soft law); Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and 
Disaggregated Democracy at 2–3 (Harv. L. Sch. Pub. L., Working Paper No. 
018, 2001 available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=283976 (discussing 
government networks)). 
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entities may seem nothing short of overwhelming.  It is possible, 
however, to discern a degree of order amid the chaos created by such 
multiplicity. 
To start with, a distinct set of treaties, organizations, and dispute 
settlement procedures generally governs each substantive issue 
area—such as the environment, human rights, trade, arms control, 
etc.  With only a few exceptions,50 discussed in greater detail below, 
the entities that operate in one issue area have no formal competence 
over other issue areas.  To illustrate, the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) does not have the authority to consider violations of 
trade or environmental agreements, even by states parties to the 
European Convention on Human Rights whose civil liberties records 
the court does scrutinize.  Often, the division of competence is even 
narrower, with an entity empowered to address only one among 
many treaties within a single issue area.  The ECHR, to continue the 
above example, cannot rule on whether a state party to the European 
Convention has violated other human rights agreements it has 
ratified, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, even though many obligations in the two treaties are virtually 
identical.51 
In practice, of course, the lines of demarcation are not always so 
sharply etched.  National land use regulations may raise human 
rights concerns as well as environmental ones, just as trade policies 
may implicate labor issues.  Formal jurisdictional boundaries do not 
bar institutions of limited competence from addressing such spillover 
effects.  Nor do they prevent international bureaucrats or jurists from 
considering “external” rules and norms in deciding how to interpret 
 
 50. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is authorized to give 
advisory opinions interpreting “other treaties concerning the protection of 
human rights in the American states.”  “Other Treaties” Subject to the 
Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court, Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of Sept. 24, 
1982, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 12, 16 OEA/Ser.L/V/III,9, doc. 13 (1983).  The 
proposed (but not yet operational) African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights will have jurisdiction to hear petitions by individuals alleging violations 
of any human rights treaty.  See Makau Mutua, The African Human Rights 
Court: A Two-Legged Stool?, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 342, 354 (1999) (discussing the 
extent of the court’s jurisdiction). 
 51. See Helfer, Forum Shopping, supra note 47, at 301–04 (describing 
typology of similarities and differences among human rights treaties). 
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treaty texts that do fall within their purview.52  These are important 
caveats.  But they do not detract from the dominant systemic theme 
of multiple institutions, each working independently of the others to 
articulate a relatively constrained set of legal norms. 
What are the consequences of decentralization and 
disaggregation for analyzing international law and international 
institutions from a constitutional perspective?  Many domestic 
constitutions require a balancing or a sharing of power among 
different governmental authorities, both vertically (between national 
and local power, for example) and horizontally (such as between 
national legislative and judicial power).  This division of authority 
among governmental actors provides an intrinsic check against abuse 
of power.  It also allows certain issues to be devolved to decision 
makers who have better expertise or are closer to the polities affected 
by their decisions.  And it creates opportunities for regulatory 
experimentation, diversity, and competition within a single national 
jurisdiction. 
The decentralized international legal system raises similar 
issues, both with respect to vertical and horizontal allocations of 
power.  In terms of vertical power dynamics, decentralization and 
disaggregation create the need for rules of relation between 
international agreements and institutions on the one hand, and 
domestic legal systems on the other.  Those rules can be plotted 
along a continuum that, at one extreme, grants absolute deference to 
states and the decisions of their governments and, at the other, gives 
international bodies the right to review domestic decisions de novo 
and to supplant them whenever they are inconsistent with a state’s 
treaty commitments.53  In between these two polestars lie various 
 
 52. For two examples of such interpretive maneuvers, see Report of the 
Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, October 12, 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, 1998 WL 720123 
(WTO) (construing GATT in light of international environmental law) and 
Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) (construing European 
Convention on Human Rights in light of International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination). 
 53. Compare Antonio F. Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in 
National Security, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 301, 326–30 (1998) (discussing 
national security exception in Article XXI of GATT which purportedly grants 
states the right to “self-judg[e]” whether the exception should be applied) with 
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gradations of international sensitivity to domestic actors and their 
actions, which appear under such headings as subsidiarity, 
complementarity, and margin of appreciation.54  As the subjects that 
treaties regulate have become more complex, it is increasingly 
common for a single treaty or treaty system to specify different 
degrees of deference for different substantive or procedural issues.55 
Whatever rules of relation a particular treaty regime adopts, the 
critical issue will be drawing lines that separate international from 
domestic decision making powers.  Who, for example, determines 
whether a particular subject or dispute falls within the authority of 
international as opposed to domestic actors?  In practice, the entity 
that answers this “[k]ompetenz-[k]ompetenz” question (that is, the 
competence to determine one’s own competence) enjoys 
considerable power both to police and to revise jurisdictional 
boundaries in ways that enhance its own authority.56 
Decentralization and disaggregation also raise important 
horizontal power allocation issues.  The horizontal division of 
 
Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 35, art. 11, 33 I.L.M. at 120 
(requiring WTO panels to make “an objective assessment” of the facts and 
relevant treaty articles when hearing disputes between WTO members).  See 
also Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 24, at 227, 243 (advocating “strict 
scrutiny of national compliance with general trade regime norms such as 
nondiscrimination, and especially procedural norms such as transparency and 
due process”). 
 54. See, e.g., Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of 
International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 40–46 (2003); 
Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of 
Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal 
Human Rights, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 391, 450–66 (2001); Mohamed M. El 
Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement 
International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 869, 870 (2002). 
 55. See Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, 
Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 193, 198–201 (1996) (analyzing deferential standards of review for anti-
dumping and countervailing duty measures under the GATT 1994 and 
comparing them to standards of review in other WTO Agreements); see also 
Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims, supra note 34, at 412–39 (proposing 
that WTO dispute settlement jurists adopt a graduated continuum of deference 
to domestic decision makers under the copyright provisions of the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). 
 56. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 17, at 305 n.128 (discussing 
kompetenz-kompetenz disputes between ECJ and national courts in Europe). 
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authority among international institutions was traditionally conceived 
along functional lines.57  Each institution was granted control 
(subject to the ultimate authority of its member states) over a specific 
set of issues and tasks in a way that generally excluded the 
competence of other institutions.  Although the ICJ recently 
reaffirmed this approach,58 pure functionalism no longer accurately 
describes most forms of international lawmaking and adjudication.  
A more accurate assessment recognizes that the proliferation of 
institutions and the blurring of issue area boundaries have enabled 
different decision makers to address similar issues in distinct 
international fora.59 
Unlike the relationships among power holders in domestic 
constitutional systems, however, the relationships among 
international institutions with overlapping competencies are rarely 
formally specified.  This de facto laissez faire approach has both 
virtues and vices.  On the benefit side, it allows different institutions 
to act as laboratories, experimenting with alternative approaches to 
resolving the same legal problems.60  Experimentation may also lead 
actors to share information and compare results, creating formal and 
informal dialogues that enrich the conversation about the pathways 
along which cooperative solutions might evolve.  A multiplicity of 
venues also allows certain institutions to develop specialized 
expertise that may, in turn, attract claims from private parties and 
create additional opportunities to press states to comply with their 
 
 57. See Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade Organization, 96 
AM. J. INT’L L. 28, 48 (2002) (discussing history of functionalism). 
 58. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 
Advisory Op., 1996 ICJ Rep. 66 ¶ 26 (July 8) available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjww/icases/ianw/ianjudgment_advisory%20opinion_10960708/iunan_
ijudgment_19960708_Advisory%opinion.htm (applying the “principle of 
specialty” and holding that World Health Organization lacked the competence 
to question the legality of using nuclear weapons). 
 59. For a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon as it applies to 
intellectual property rights, see Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The 
TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property 
Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Helfer, Regime Shifting]. 
 60. Those alternatives may include some organizations that promote 
cooperation using soft law and others that generate legally binding 
commitments, as well as organizations with greater or lesser degrees of 
accessibility to nonstate actors. 
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treaty commitments.  Finally, granting two or more institutions 
shared competence over a particular issue area may engender healthy 
inter-organizational rivalries in which institutions curb each other’s 
expansive tendencies or compete to provide a superior set of services 
to member states and other constituencies.61 
The relatively unstructured horizontal relationships among 
disaggregated international institutions also have problematic 
consequences, however.  Dividing lawmaking or dispute settlement 
authority over a single issue area may create inefficiencies, needless 
duplication or bureaucratization of work, and opportunities for forum 
shopping.62  It may also force officials to address discrete (but 
interrelated) aspects of a regulatory problem in different venues, 
rather than developing a comprehensive solution.63  In addition, 
governments may create institutions with overlapping jurisdictions, 
not to foster competition or experimentation, but as a safety valve to 
 
 61. See Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional Linkage: Transcending “Trade 
and . . .”, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 77, 92 (2002) (discussing “[t]he [r]ole of 
[i]nterorganizational [c]ompetition”).  Such competition may also arise in 
response to domestic pressures, for example when states create a new 
institution to express their dissatisfaction with the activities of an existing one.  
See Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 59, at 14-17 (discussing motivations 
for United States and EC to shift intellectual property lawmaking from the 
World Intellectual Property Organization to the WTO). 
 62. In the human rights context, for example, more than a dozen courts, 
tribunals, and treaty bodies have been created to receive complaints from 
individuals and groups challenging governments’ human rights practices.  See 
Helfer, Forum Shopping, supra note 47, at 296–98.  Several studies have 
argued that some or all of these bodies should be consolidated into a single 
human rights court or similar institution.  See Philip Alston, Effective 
Functioning of Bodies Established Pursuant to United Nations Human Rights 
Instruments: Final Report on Enhancing the Long-Term Effectiveness of the 
United Nations Human Rights Treaty System, U.N. ESCOR, 53d Sess., Anex, 
Agenda Item 15, ¶¶ 14–36, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74 (1997); Thomas 
Buergenthal, Remarks, The UN Human Rights Regime: Is It Effective?, 91 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 482, 483 (1997).  But see Helfer, Forum Shopping, 
supra note 47, at 346–60 (defending the use of forum shopping given the 
current decentralized nature of the international human rights petition system). 
 63. See MICHEL PETIT ET AL., WHY GOVERNMENTS CAN’T MAKE POLICY: 
THE CASE OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA 6 
(2002) (lamenting that the “multiplicity of interests and fora, and the existence 
of several debates or negotiations taking place simultaneously, can . . . lead to 
poorly coordinated, inconsistent, and even contradictory policies”). 
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placate the demands of domestic interest groups.64  Finally, a 
multiplicity of lawmaking fora creates the possibility of conflicts 
among legal norms and allows states to justify their conduct as 
sanctioned by one treaty even if that same conduct violates the 
prescriptions of another international agreement.65  I assess the risk 
of such conflicts and the different approaches to minimize them in 
the following section. 
IV.  NORMATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL HIERARCHIES 
In constitutional systems, the controversies raised by horizontal 
and vertical divisions of power are often resolved by granting 
particular institutions or particular norms a higher order status that 
trumps competing institutions or norms within the same system.66  
The international legal system too contains normative and 
institutional hierarchies that, upon initial inspection, seem to offer a 
tool for resolving the difficulties that decentralization and 
disaggregation may engender.  As I explain below, however, these 
hierarchies do not (at least in their present form) provide a blueprint 
for resolving questions of governance in a manner analogous to the 
hierarchies enshrined in domestic constitutions. 
Consider first the body of rules known to international lawyers 
as jus cogens or peremptory norms.  These are an evolving set of 
legal norms acknowledged by states to have attained the status of 
“higher” international law from which no derogation is permitted.67  
 
 64. Governments may find it advantageous, for example, to address the 
intersection between trade and labor issues not in the WTO, where treaty 
commitments are made meaningful through a robust dispute settlement system, 
but in the ILO whose rules and dispute settlement institutions are much 
weaker.  See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS 
REGULATION 567 (2000). 
 65. See Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: 
Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 
675, 699 (1993) (noting the inefficiencies created by “overlapping provisions 
in agreements, inconsistencies in obligations, significant gaps in coverage, and 
duplication of goals and responsibilities”). 
 66. This is not to suggest that such institutions or norms necessary remain 
constant over time, nor that their placement precludes domestic actors from 
contesting their primacy. 
 67. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 613 (9th Cir.) (en 
banc) (“[J]us cogens embraces customary laws considered binding on all 
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Indeed, so strong is the normative force of jus cogens that any treaty 
that conflicts with them is simply void.68 
In theory, the existence of jus cogens provides a basis for a 
normative ordering of the international legal system.  In practice, 
only a very narrow list of rules has thus far achieved this elevated 
status.  Other than a ban on unauthorized uses of force, peremptory 
norms concern the most serious human rights abuses, such as slavery 
and slave trading, genocide, extrajudicial killing, forced 
disappearances, torture, degrading treatment or punishment, 
prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimination.69  
These are unquestionably egregious acts.  But they are a far more 
circumscribed list than the catalog of individual liberties given pride 
of place in many domestic constitutions (and in human rights law 
generally).  Nor, more importantly, do these norms provide an 
adequate foundation for resolving the most pressing power sharing 
and conflicts issues that the international legal system now faces.  
They offer no guidance for resolving competency disputes among 
international lawmaking institutions, nor do they constrain decision 
makers to follow precepts that are often considered hallmarks of 
legitimate governance, such as adherence to the rule of law, due 
process, transparency, and non-discrimination. 
Recognizing such inadequacies, some commentators have 
attempted to expand the list of jus cogens to include all human 
rights70 or, alternatively, to embrace the core values of international 
 
nations and is derived from values taken to be fundamental by the international 
community, rather than from the fortuitous or self-interested choices of 
nations.”), cert. granted sub. nom. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 807 
(2003). 
 68. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (defining 
peremptory norms). 
 69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. n (1987) (stating that “[n]ot all human rights norms 
are peremptory norms (jus cogens)” but including rights listed in the text as 
having attained that elevated status). 
 70. See, e.g., Warren Allmand, The Primacy of Human Rights in 
International Law, at http://serveur.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/ 
globalization/globalAllmandTechnical.html (last visited September 2, 2003) 
(asserting the “primacy of human rights obligations” over other rules of 
international law); Robert Howse & Makau Mutua, Protecting Human Rights 
in a Global Economy: Challenges for the World Trade Organization 5 (Int’l 
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economic law.71  Both arguments are contested and controversial, 
however, suggesting that, whatever their substantive merits, these 
claims should be regarded as pathways along which the international 
legal system might evolve, rather than accurate statements of existing 
positive law. 
What hierarchical orderings are possible in the absence of a 
comprehensive body of peremptory norms?  One possibility is found 
in Article 103 of the UN Charter, which states that “[i]n the event of 
a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any 
other international agreement, their obligations under the present 
Charter shall prevail.”72  This “UN supremacy clause” might be seen 
as granting the UN an institutional primacy over other 
intergovernmental organizations.  Indeed, commentators have used 
Article 103 in precisely this way, arguing that “the aims and 
purposes of the UN, [including] maintenance of peace and security, 
and the promotion and protection of human rights, constitute an 
international public order to which other treaty regimes must 
conform.”73 
In practice, however, Article 103 has been given a narrow 
construction that emphasizes the preeminence of specific Security 
 
Centre for Human Rts. & Democratic Dev., Policy Paper, 2000) (“In the event 
of a conflict between a universally recognized human right and a commitment 
ensuing from international treaty law such as a trade agreement, the latter must 
be interpreted to be consistent with the former.”). 
 71. The foremost proponent of this approach is Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann.  
See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Economic 
Law in the 21st Century: the Need to Clarify their Interrelationships, 4 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 3 (2001); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and 
Human Rights, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 19 (2000). 
 72. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, art. 103, 59 Stat. 1031, 
T.S. 993 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945).  Other international agreements 
often acknowledge the Charter’s supremacy.  See, e.g., General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 266, art. XXI(c) (stating 
that nothing in GATT shall be construed “to prevent any contracting party 
from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations 
Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security”). 
 73. Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 273, 304 (2002); see also Bardo Fassbender, The 
United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community, 36 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529 (1998). 
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Council resolutions over inconsistent treaty obligations.74  Broader 
efforts to bootstrap the entire corpus of human rights law or other 
international rules to a position of primacy under the Charter have 
been met with considerable skepticism.  The reason for this is clear 
enough:  although Article 103 specifies that the Charter’s obligations 
trump other treaty commitments, its open-ended text does not specify 
with any degree of precision which norms are entitled to that higher 
order status.75  That interpretive task remains to be developed by UN 
institutions and by the discursive practices of its member states. 
Yet another potential candidate for international hierarchy is 
found in Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
entitled “Application of Successive Treaties Relating to the Same 
Subject-Matter.”76  Article 30 sets out a series of default rules to 
determine which of two treaties negotiated at different points in time 
is to be given effect in the event of a conflict between them.77  By 
providing a mechanism to reconcile seemingly inconsistent treaty 
commitments, Article 30 would seem to fill a critical void in a 
decentralized, disaggregated legal system whose treaty population is 
becoming increasingly dense.  Sadly, the conflicts rules that Article 
 
 74. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal 
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.; 
Libya v. U.S.), 1998  I.C.J. 3, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ilus/ilus_isummaries/ilus_19920414.htm (invoking 
Article 103 to uphold UN Security Council resolution imposing sanctions 
against Libya in the face of conflicting treaty obligations).  See also Alvarez, 
supra note 40, at 7 (emphasizing that Article 103 has been authoritatively 
interpreted to address only the “relatively narrow” issue of the authority of 
certain UN organs “to override pre-existing treaty obligations and to instruct 
U.N. members to do likewise”). 
 75. See Alvarez, supra note 40, at 7 (“Article 103 does not say which 
customary international law obligations are to be given privileged status as 
U.N. Charter obligations”); see also Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute 
Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 753, 798 n.140 (2002) 
(critiquing claim by Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de 
l’Homme, ‘Rapport l’OMC et les droits de l’homme’ No. 320 (Nov. 2001), 
that Article 103 gives primacy to all human rights obligations over other treaty 
commitments). 
 76. See Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 30, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339–40. 
 77. The provisions of Article 30 are “default rules” because governments 
are free to opt-out of them and include different conflicts rules in the treaties 
they negotiate.  Id. art. 30(2). 
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30 endorses are far from clear and have engendered confusion rather 
than certainty. 
Consider first the scope of Article 30, which applies only to 
“successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter.”78  
Determining whether the subject matter of two international 
agreements is the same is hardly a straightforward exercise.  Are two 
treaties that seek to preserve different aspects of the global 
environment the same, or must the subject matter nexus be tighter?  
The drafting history of the Vienna Convention provides minimal 
insight, and authoritative commentary offers little more, merely 
stating that the clause should be “construed strictly” and should 
exclude “cases where a general treaty impinges indirectly on the 
content of a particular provision of an earlier treaty.”79  If two 
international agreements do not share the same subject matter, 
Article 30’s conflicts rules simply do not apply, leaving states with 
little guidance over how to reconcile their inconsistent treaty 
commitments. 
The difficulties only deepen where two treaties are related.  
Assuming that all of the states parties to both treaties are the same 
(or that the states parties differ but a dispute arises between states 
that have ratified both agreements), Article 30 adopts a rule of lex 
posterior, directing that the later treaty is to be applied to the extent 
of any conflict with the earlier one.80  If, however, only one of the 
disputing states has ratified both treaties, precisely the opposite rule 
(lex prior) applies.  The earlier agreement governs since that is the 
only text to which both disputing states have agreed to be bound. 
Both of these temporal rule choices are problematic.  Lex 
posterior relieves states of the impossibility of complying with 
inconsistent international commands, but does so by mechanically 
applying the latter agreement without considering the treaties’ 
underlying substantive values.  It thus “takes account neither of the 
 
 78. Id. art. 30(1). 
 79. SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
TREATIES 98 (2d ed. 1984). 
 80. See Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 30(3), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339 
(“When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty . . . 
the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible 
with those of the later treaty.”). 
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issues actually involved in [a] conflict nor of the interests evident (or 
not evident) in both treaty regimes in having their respective rules 
applied.”81  Article 30 also endorses the proposition that more recent 
treaties are normatively superior to older ones, a claim belied by the 
realities of present day international lawmaking in which new 
agreements reach back into the past to link up with earlier ones and 
forward into the future as they are augmented and revised over 
time.82  The lex prior rule is even more troublesome.  It suffers from 
the same flaws as its cousin, but in addition it leaves the state that 
has ratified two inconsistent agreements with no guidance as to how 
to reconcile that conflict.83  It is hardly surprising, therefore, that 
commentators have dubbed Article 30 “an entirely unsatisfactory 
response” to the problem of conflicting treaties.84 
States have responded to these inadequacies by opting-out of the 
Vienna Convention, drafting treaty-specific conflicts rules to mediate 
the relationship among international agreements.  Most often, these 
rules take the form of “savings clauses” which clarify that the 
provisions of one treaty do not prejudice or otherwise undermine the 
obligations of some other agreement.85  Although this contracting 
 
 81. Gregory H. Fox, International Organizations: Conflicts of International 
Law, 95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 183, 186 (2001). 
 82. See J.H. Reichman, The Know-How Gap in the TRIPS Agreement: Why 
Software Fared Badly, and What Are the Solutions, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 763, 765 (1995) (discussing the “backward-looking character” of the 
TRIPs Agreement); Chris Wold, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and 
the GATT: Conflict and Resolution?, 26 ENVTL. L. 841, 912–13 (1996) 
(discussing procedures for adoption of protocols to environmental law treaties 
and the difficulties they create under Vienna Convention Article 30). 
 83. See Bruce Neuling, The Shrimp-Turtle Case: Implications for Article 
XX of GATT and the Trade and Environment Debate, 22 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 1, 12 (1998) (Article 30 “provides no practical guidance on 
how the country that is a party to both treaties is to reconcile conflicting legal 
obligations.”). 
 84. Fox, supra note 81, at 185 (paraphrasing SINCLAIR, supra note 79, at 
98). 
 85. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 60, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 250 
[hereinafter European Convention] (“Nothing in this Convention shall be 
construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High 
Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party.”). 
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around Article 30’s default rule is eminently sensible, deciding 
which treaty rules enjoy priority in the event of a conflict is often 
highly contested.  In several recent negotiations, states were unable 
to agree on clear savings rules and adopted instead a set of 
aspirational but ambiguous clauses in the treaties’ preambles, the 
legal effect of which has yet to be conclusively determined.86 
International tribunals have also mitigated Article 30’s mischief 
by narrowly construing the types of inconsistencies that rise to the 
level of a conflict.  WTO dispute settlement panels, for example, 
presume that two treaties relating to the same subject matter are 
compatible and can be implemented by a state that has ratified both 
agreements.  A true conflict exists only where treaty rules are 
mutually inconsistent, in the sense that a state’s compliance with one 
rule necessarily compels it to violate another.87  Although this 
narrow definition avoids Article 30’s problems, it creates 
considerable uncertainty about the scope of states’ obligations when 
treaties are in tension with each other.  A more promising approach 
has been followed by tribunals that refuse to hide behind formalistic 
rules and instead interpret treaties that straddle subject matter 
boundaries by harmonizing the texts, objectives, and values in both 
issue areas.88 
As this discussion reveals, normative and institutional 
hierarchies are as vital to international legal systems as they are to 
constitutional ones.  A key difference is that constitutional 
hierarchies are generally fixed at the time when the founding 
documents are drafted, whereas international law hierarchies are 
continually evolving and (often) continually contested.  At present, 
 
 86. See Sabrina Saffrin, Treaties in Collision? The Biosafety Protocol and 
the World Trade Organization Agreements, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 606, 614–18 
(2002). 
 87. See Panel Report on Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the 
Automobile Industry, July 2, 1998, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R & 
WT/DS64/R ¶ 14.28 in 7 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT DECISIONS: BERNAN’S ANNOTATED REPORTED 164, 488 (1999) 
(“[I]n public international law there is a presumption against conflict.”); see 
also id. at 488 n.649 (“[T]here is a conflict when two (or more) treaty 
instruments contain obligations which cannot be complied with 
simultaneously . . . .  Incompatibility of contents is an essential condition of 
conflict.”). 
 88. See supra note 52. 
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these hierarchies are still in a nascent stage of development that will 
require further refinement before they can crystallize into system-
wide normative or institutional orderings. 
V.  COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 
In most domestic legal systems, particularly rule of law societies 
and liberal democracies, the implicit assumption is one of adherence 
to legal rules.  Affected parties may vigorously oppose new legal 
proscriptions through the judicial process, often by testing them 
against higher order constitutional norms.  And such challenges may 
on occasion produce crises of constitutional magnitude in which 
tensions flare between different sources of domestic political 
authority.  But in the large majority of cases, once a rule’s validity 
has been conclusively determined, the parties whom it affects know 
that the state possesses a variety of tools to sanction noncompliance.  
Noncompliance still occurs, of course, but it does so constrained by 
the shadow of legal systems that enjoy relatively robust enforcement 
powers. 
The international legal system is radically different, and for that 
reason constitutional analogies are less salient in this area than 
elsewhere.  Because of underlying power differentials and the dearth 
of external coercive authority,89 compliance with treaties and other 
international commitments is decidedly not taken as a given.  Quite 
to the contrary, compliance is a subject of intense examination and 
debate by both international lawyers and political scientists.90  An 
entire school of IR theory contends that international law is 
epiphenomenal—i.e., that it reflects rather than constrains existing 
distributions of power among nations.91  Most international legal 
 
 89. See supra Part III. 
 90. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 
90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1826 (2002) (“[C]ompliance is one of the most central 
questions in international law.”).  For a comprehensive survey of the 
compliance literature, see Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 539–45 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002). 
 91. See MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1999) 
(“International relations [IR] scholars have traditionally . . . regarded 
international law as something of an epiphenomenon, with rules of 
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scholars, by contrast, agree with the famous assertion that “almost all 
nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost 
all of their obligations almost all of the time.”92  But only recently 
have they moved from anecdotal narratives about compliance to case 
studies93 and more ambitious empirical projects testing the veracity 
of that claim.94 
One important explanation for this preoccupation with questions 
of compliance is the lack of strong international enforcement 
mechanisms.  As explained earlier, most treaties lack resilient 
judicial oversight.  Those few regimes where international tribunals 
do have teeth (such as the EU, WTO, and European Convention) are, 
not surprisingly, progressing the furthest along the path toward 
constitutionalization.95  Outside of the judicial realm, the prospects 
for collective enforcement of legal obligations are not much brighter.  
The UN Security Council’s sanctioning powers are notoriously weak 
and politicized, and regional sanctioning practices are only 
marginally better.96 
 
international law being dependent on power, subject to short-term alteration by 
power-applying States, and therefore of little relevance to how States actually 
behave.”). 
 92. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 
(2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted). 
 93. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: 
International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash 
Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002) [hereinafter 
Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights]. 
 94. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a 
Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1940, 1962–2002 (2002) (presenting 
extensive quantitative analysis of states’ human rights practices and concluding 
that “noncompliance [with treaty obligations] appears [to be] common” and 
that “treaty ratification is not infrequently associated with worse . . . human 
rights ratings than would otherwise be expected”).  For a broad based critique 
of this ambitious empirical study and the author’s reply, see Ryan Goodman & 
Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 171 (2003); Oona A. Hathaway, Testing Conventional Wisdom, 14 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 185 (2003). 
 95. See supra Part II. 
 96. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW 
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
AGREEMENTS 34–67 (1995) (discussing weak sanctioning mechanisms in 
international law). 
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In the absence of robust third party enforcement mechanisms, 
scholars have sought other explanations for why compliance with 
international obligations does or does not occur.  One crucial force 
favoring compliance is reciprocity—the right of a state adversely 
affected by another state’s violation of its commitments to withhold 
its own performance under a treaty or customary law.97  The prospect 
of such reciprocal noncompliance is a form of self help that creates 
an incentive for states to adhere to international law,98 although the 
strength of that incentive varies across issue areas.  In the trade 
context, for example, the prospect of a state raising tariff barriers in 
response to its trading partner’s restriction of imports can be a 
considerable deterrent.  But the threat to torture one’s own citizens as 
a response to acts of torture of another state’s nationals would be 
morally unthinkable as well as practically useless.99 
Even where the reciprocity operates effectively, it is not 
immediately apparent why states don’t simply renege on their 
commitments while attempting to hide that fact and benefit from the 
compliance of their treaty partners.  As analyses of international 
cooperation using the insights of game theory—most notably the 
classic Prisoner’s Dilemma—have shown, defection by all parties 
(i.e. reciprocal noncompliance) is often the equilibrium position.100  
Without more, then, anarchy, rather than a legal order, would seem 
to be the dominant mode of interstate relations. 
Two different strands of IR theory suggest why this is not so.  
The first views states as rational, self-interested (and unitary) actors 
that maximize their own welfare.  The puzzle for rational choice 
scholars has been to explain how states acting under this set of 
assumptions could move from defection to cooperation.  The answer 
 
 97. See Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346; see 
also John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist 
International Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the 
Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
 98. See David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 817, 831–32 (2002). 
 99. Quite sensibly, the Vienna Convention excludes human rights 
agreements from the agreements that may be terminated or suspended as a 
consequence of another state’s breach.  See Vienna Convention, supra note 6, 
art. 60(5), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346. 
 100. See Setear, supra note 97, at 27–31. 
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is found in international regimes and institutions which transform the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma from a single play to an iterated game and use 
information sharing, third party monitoring, dispute settlement, and 
other tools to “lengthen the shadow of the future” so that cooperation 
becomes entrenched.101  As performance records are exposed and 
institutions link across issue areas, states begin to consider the 
reputation costs of breaching their legal commitments.  Acquiring a 
reputation as a rule violator means that “other states may refuse to 
enter into future agreements, demand greater concessions when 
entering into such agreements, or lose faith in the strength of existing 
agreements” that matter to the putative violating state.102 
The second strand of IR theory focuses on norms rather than 
interests.  It argues that international legal rules possess a unique 
persuasive pull that leads states to alter their behavior in favor of 
compliance.  Different strands of normative theory focus on the 
legitimacy of international law, its internalization into domestic legal 
systems, and designing regimes to promote a shift of preferences and 
values among state actors.103  Scholars of this school are equally 
concerned with identifying the causes of compliance, and have 
examined the role of norm entrepreneurs and norm cascades, 
transnational advocacy networks, and domestic compliance 
constituencies as agents of change.104 
Both rationalist and normative IR theories thus share the belief 
that compliance is possible even in a decentralized legal system.  Yet 
 
 101. Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: 
Interests, Reputation, Institutions, 93 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 375, 378 
(2000) (“Institutions that lengthen the shadow of the future or link otherwise 
separate issues may create incentives to cooperate now for the sake of 
promoting cooperation by others later.”). 
 102. Guzman, supra note 90, at 1829 n.16. 
 103. See Hathaway, supra note 94, at 1955–62 (reviewing normative 
compliance models); see also George W. Downs et al., The Transformational 
Model of International Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 465, 471 (2000) (discussing regime design). 
 104. See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm 
Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998); Judith Goldstein 
& Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A 
Cautionary Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 603 (2000); Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, 
The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights 
Trials in Latin America, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2001). 
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the general absence of strong enforcement machinery continues to 
generate disputes about the depth of cooperation such a system can 
achieve.  Some scholars argue that the proper response to a dearth of 
enforcement is to manage compliance by nonconfrontational 
measures that monitor behavior, build capacity, and resolve disputes 
informally, thereby persuading states to adhere to their treaty 
commitments.105  Others counter that such approaches work only 
where legal commitments are shallow (that is, where they require 
little change from the existing baseline of states’ conduct).106  Where 
states negotiate more demanding treaty commitments, these scholars 
argue, they also adopt more powerful enforcement systems, in the 
absence of which cooperation is likely to break down.107 
This debate brings the story full circle.  In a sense, scholars of 
international law and politics are deliberating the preconditions of 
constitutionalism, that is, whether agreements among nation states 
even amount to “law” and the circumstances under which a promise 
to adhere to treaty commitments is borne out in practice.  Because 
the answers to these fundamental questions are still contested and 
unsettled, constitutional analogies must be tempered to the 
particularities of individual international regimes with different 
compliance records and different enforcement mechanisms. 
VI.  EXIT AND ESCAPE 
Another point of comparison between international and 
constitutional systems concerns the rules and procedures each uses to 
revise, suspend, and terminate previous commitments.  A common 
analytical thread these issues raise is the link between how 
commitments are created and how they are ended.  As explained in 
greater detail below, constitutions and constitutional obligations are, 
as a rule, more difficult to enter into and to exit from than treaties,108 
 
 105. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 96, at 22–28. 
 106. Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory 
Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 387, 408 (2000) (“Depth refers in 
this context to the degree of costly change a treaty requires from the status quo 
ante.”). 
 107. See George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance 
Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 379–80 (1996). 
 108. More difficult, but not impossible, particularly where affected parties 
can opt-out of applicable legal norms by “going private.”  See Elizabeth G. 
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a fact with important implications for both domestic political 
structures and international cooperation. 
Consider first the drafting of domestic constitutions, which often 
occurs during periods of intense reflection and deliberation by 
national polities over the norms, institutions, and procedures that will 
control the government’s relationship to the governed.  The rules 
agreed to during such “constitutional moments” are deliberately 
elevated above the normal political fray.  The justification for 
imposing such antidemocratic constraints on future majoritarian 
lawmaking is the “extraordinary levels of democratic consent . . . to 
the rules that will tie the hands of future governments,” including 
“referenda, supermajority votes, and elected constitutional 
assemblies.”109  In most instances, these higher order rules cannot be 
altered by subsequent generations except by the use of comparably 
exceptional procedures.110  Constitutions, in short, are designed to be 
sticky precisely to deter future retrenchments away from the values 
they enshrine. 
Many international agreements and institutions share this 
propensity for stickiness.  In the human rights area, for example, 
scholars have argued that governments in newly democratic states 
ratify human rights treaties for many of the same reasons that they 
adopt constitutions—to prevent their successors from backsliding 
away from democratic rule.111  Stringent treaty amendment 
 
Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet Dispute 
Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 151 (2000) (discussing a Internet dispute 
settlement mechanisms that allow private parties to contract out of public law 
norms). 
 109. Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 24, at 237. 
 110. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian 
Constitution, TEX. L. REV. 703, 798–99 (2002) (discussing amendment 
procedures in U.S. Const. art. V); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of 
Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 
DUKE L.J. 223, 276 n.220 (2001) (discussing amendment procedures for 
German and Canadian constitutions and noting that the U.S. Constitution is 
“much more difficult” to change). 
 111. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: 
Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 228 (2000).  
Given this justification for ratification, it is significant that several human 
rights treaties, unlike the international agreements discussed below, do not 
contain denunciation clauses.  See Elizabeth Evatt, Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea and the ICCPR: Denunciation as an Exercise of the Right of 
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procedures serve similar functions, safeguarding the compromises 
reached during what are often lengthy and contentious negotiations 
by permitting the parties to revisit those deals only if all (or a large 
majority) of the signatories agree to do so.112  International tribunals 
too can enhance the durability of intergovernmental cooperation.  
Where, as with the ECJ, such tribunals interpret or augment treaty 
bargains to grant rights to private parties, they create domestic 
constituencies that make it politically impossible to reverse the 
governments’ initial decision to cooperate.113  Still another form of 
self-limitation occurs when legislators give executive officials power 
to negotiate international package deals, reserving for themselves 
only the right to accept or reject the treaty package as a whole.114 
These examples illustrate the parallels between the hands tying 
functions of treaties and those of constitutions.  But the analogy 
should not be overstated because in many important ways legalized 
international cooperation is not a one way ratchet.  To the contrary, 
such cooperation occurs in the shadow of differentiated applicability 
rules that, at the front end, allow states both to opt into and to opt out 
of specific obligations and, at the back end, permit them to exit and 
escape from their treaty commitments.115 
 
Self-Defence?, 5 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 215, 219–20 (1999) (discussing North 
Korea’s attempt to denounce the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and UN Human Rights Committee’s conclusion that the drafters of the 
Covenant intended to preclude states parties from denouncing the treaty). 
 112. See Bernhard Boockmann & Paul W. Thurner, Flexibility Provisions in 
Multilateral Environmental Treaties, Discussion Paper No. 02-44 (2002), at 
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp0244.pdf (survey of 400 environmental 
law treaties noting their unanimity, consensus, and qualified majority voting 
rules for the adoption of amendments); see also Barbara Koremenos, 
Loosening the Ties That Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility, 55 
INT’L ORG. 289, 309, 313 (2001) (discussing the amendment provision of 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and Antarctic Treaty and concluding in the 
case of the latter treaty that the contracting states “ma[de] it very difficult to 
either modify or withdraw from the agreement” during its first thirty years). 
 113. See Weiler, supra note 15, at 2412 (discussing the “closure of selective 
Exit” from the European Community by its member states). 
 114. See Hal Shapiro & Lael Brainard, Trade Promotion Authority Formerly 
Known as Fast Track: Building Common Ground on Trade Demands More 
Than a Name Change, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1 (2003). 
 115. These differentiated treaty applicability rules are the subject of a 
research agenda on “Exit, Escape, and Commitment in International 
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Front end opt-ins and opt-outs come in a variety of different 
stripes.  The most well known opt-out mechanism is the filing of a 
reservation—a document that a state appends to its ratification of a 
treaty to limit or qualify the scope of its obligations.116  Many 
international agreements expressly preclude states from filing 
reservations to preserve the precise package of negotiated 
commitments.117  But many others permit these unilateral carve outs, 
subject to the overriding limitation that they do not prejudice the 
object and purpose of the agreement.118 
Opt-in rules are somewhat less common, but are found in 
agreements supplemented through optional protocols or annexes that 
allow the parties to the principal treaty text to decide if and when to 
take on additional commitments.119  Other important examples are 
plurilateral codes—families of treaties that require ratifying states to 
accept certain treaty obligations but make others entirely 
voluntarily.120  In other cases, these differentiated rules find their 
 
Governance” that I am pursuing as a Fellow in the Program in Law and Public 
Affairs at Princeton University.  See Princeton Program in Law and Public 
Affairs, http://www.princeton.edu/~lapa/main.html. 
 116. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 2(1)(d), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(defining reservations).  For a recent discussion of the use of reservations, see 
Frederic L. Kirgis, ASIL Insights: Reservations to Treaties and United States 
Practice (May 2003), at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh105.htm. 
 117. The WTO is one such agreement.  See Final Act, supra note 25, art. 
XVI, ¶ 5, 33 I.L.M. at 1175. 
 118. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 19(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331.  Sometimes opt-out provisions are made a part of the treaty itself.  See 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, done July 
14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 App. (setting out a special regime of nonexclusive 
compulsory licenses for developing countries that grant rights to translate or 
otherwise reproduce copyrighted works needed for teaching, scholarship, or 
research purposes in those countries). 
 119. See, e.g., Organization of American States: Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, approved June 8, 
1990, 29 I.L.M. 1447; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into 
force Mar. 23, 1976). 
 120. See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-
Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339, 357–
59 (2002) (discussing plurilateral codes adopted during the Tokyo Round of 
GATT). 
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expression in transition and phase-in provisions that delay the onset 
of treaty obligations for certain member states but not others.121 
In contrast to opt-out and opt-in rules which operate ex ante, exit 
and escape mechanisms come into play after a state has ratified a 
treaty.  Exit mechanisms take the form of denunciation clauses that 
allow any ratifying state unilaterally to withdraw from a treaty, 
thereby terminating its obligations.  Significantly, many of these 
clauses permit denunciations for any reason or for no reason at all.  
All that the withdrawing state must do is to notify the other treaty 
parties of its decision, which then takes effect a short time after 
notice is given.122 
Somewhat less prevalent and having a less drastic effect are 
escape clauses, provisions that permit states to temporarily derogate 
from or suspend their treaty obligations for a specific period of time 
in response to war, emergencies, or changed circumstances.123  One 
 
 121. The TRIPs Agreement’s phase in rules for developing and least 
developed WTO members provide a notable example.  See Helfer, 
Adjudicating Copyright Claims, supra note 34, at 431. 
 122. See, e.g., Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora, done Mar. 3, 1973, art. XXIV, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 1116, 
993 U.N.T.S. 243, 257, (“Any Party may denounce the present Convention by 
written notification . . . [to] take effect twelve months after the Depositary 
Government has received the notification.”); International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, art. XI, para. 1, 62 Stat. 1716, 1721 
(providing that any party may withdraw by written notification to the 
depositary government on or before January 1 of a given year, with withdrawal 
effective on June 30 of that year).  Some treaties prohibit denunciations until 
they have been in force for a particular length of time.  See European 
Convention, supra note 85, art. 65(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 252 (providing that, 
after the Convention has been in force for five years, any party may withdraw 
by written notification to the Secretary-General of Council of Europe, with 
withdrawal effective six months after such notice).  Others set out substantive 
standards that limit withdrawals, but allow the withdrawing state to decide 
whether those standards have been met.  See Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. XV(2), 23 U.S.T. 
3435, (“Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right 
to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to 
the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.”) 
(emphasis added).  Still other agreements qualify, condition, or, occasionally, 
preclude exit altogether.  See Evatt, supra note 111, at 219–20. 
 123. See B. Peter Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, The Optimal Design of 
International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, 55 INT’L ORG. 829, 
830 (2001) (defining “escape clauses” of international agreements as “any 
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important example of such an escape mechanism is the Agreement 
on Safeguards, a treaty that specifies the conditions under which a 
WTO member can suspend its free trade commitments under the 
GATT in response to economic shocks.124  A very different example 
is found in human rights agreements, which permit states to derogate 
from the protection of certain individual liberties during times of 
public emergency.125 
These examples suggest that exit and escape clauses are an 
important aspect of treaty design along with other “risk 
management” tools such as reservations, amendment procedures, 
dispute settlement clauses, and specification of standards of review 
to be applied by international tribunals.126  But the existence of such 
clauses says nothing about whether states will in fact invoke them.127  
Although there have been a number of high profile derogations and 
suspensions in recent years,128 international cooperation would be 
 
provision[s] of an international agreement that allow[] a country to suspend the 
concessions it previously negotiated without violating or abrogating the terms 
of the agreement”). 
 124. See Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A, in FINAL ACT 
EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, at 1 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm. 
 125. See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, 
Costa Rica,” Nov. 22, 1969, art. 27, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144, 152 (entered into 
force July 18, 1978) (identifying limited emergency situations in which 
ratifying states may derogate from their treaty obligations but also listing rights 
from which no derogation is permitted). 
 126. See RICHARD B. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENT 23–77 (1981) (identifying a suite of general risk management 
techniques in treaties). 
 127. From an instrumentalist perspective, a state will choose to exit or 
escape from its treaty commitments if benefits of denunciation or derogation 
outweigh the costs.  That cost benefit calculation is likely to vary widely.  
Denunciations of agreements, such as those creating the WTO and the EU, 
which link different substantive obligations into multi-issue packages 
supported by broad cross sections of domestic interest groups, create 
significant costs and thus are unlikely to occur. 
 128. See Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights, supra note 93, at 1881–82 
(discussing denunciation of human rights agreements by Guyana, Jamaica, and 
Trinidad & Tobago); Charles Hutzler, U.S. Presses U.N. to Act Quickly on 
North Korea: Washington Sees the Need for Security Council Role in Halting 
Nuclear Plans, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2003, at A16 (discussing North Korea’s 
withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty); New Zealand Opposes 
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impossible if states habitually walked away from their treaty 
obligations.  Yet exit and escape mechanisms, if appropriately 
constrained, can serve several useful functions. 
Exit can be a valid response to changed circumstances arising 
after ratification or to jurisprudential shifts that cause treaty 
commitments to become overlegalized.129  Where states periodically 
negotiate revisions to treaties, exit clauses can increase bargaining 
power by allowing states to threaten to leave the regime if at least 
some of their demands are not met.130  Exit can also function as the 
ultimate check on international institutions, allowing states to 
influence their actions and, if necessary, create alternative 
organizations that better serve their interests.131  Finally, exit may 
actually be a superior response from the perspective of respect for 
 
Iceland Bid to Re-enter Whaling Body, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Apr. 24, 2003, 
available at 2003 WL 2787030 (discussing Iceland’s withdrawal and 
subsequent readmission to International Whaling Commission); Kate 
O’Hanlon, Detention of Suspected International Terrorists Not Incompatible 
with Human Rights, INDEP. (London) Oct. 29, 2002, at 18 (discussing the 
United Kingdom’s derogation from article 5(1) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, to detain foreign nationals suspected of being terrorists); Eliza 
Patterson, ASIL Insights: The US Provides Section 201 Relief for the American 
Steel Industry (Mar. 2002), at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh84.htm 
(analyzing temporary increase in tariffs on imports of certain steel products to 
protect US steel industry).  A related phenomenon is the United States decision 
to “unsign” the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court.  See 
Curtis A. Bradley, ASIL Insights: U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify 
International Criminal Court Treaty (May 2002), at http://www.asil.org/ 
insights/insigh87.htm. 
 129. See Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights, supra note 93, at 1891–94 
(discussing denunciation of human rights treaties by three Commonwealth 
Caribbean governments in response to changes in legalization levels brought 
about by interactions between international tribunals and a domestic court). 
 130. See Steinberg, supra note 120, at 348–49 (discussing different ways in 
which powerful countries use threats of exit to achieve their negotiating 
objectives). 
 131. See David D. Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the 
North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of 
Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 154, 155 (1995) (the 
creation of a new, rival institution can be viewed as “an institutional release 
mechanism” that compensates for the inability of an existing institution to alter 
its position); cf. Stephan, supra note 20, at 693 (stating that “individual 
members may threaten to resort to the exit option to rein in” the bureaucracy of 
an intergovernmental organization). 
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law, where the alternative is to publicly profess adherence but fail to 
comply in fact. 
Escape mechanisms too can have beneficial uses.  They allow 
states to commit to deeper levels of cooperation ex ante while 
preserving the flexibility to respond ex post to temporary external 
shocks and pressures from domestic interest groups—events that 
might overwhelm more constraining treaty commitments and force 
governments to revise or exit from the treaty.  But not all escape 
clauses are created equal.  The critical issue is to design optimal 
penalties or constraints that allow efficient uses of escape clauses 
while deterring opportunism.132 
Taken together, these differentiated applicability rules reinforce 
the notion that treaties—whatever their putative normative force—
continue to be conditioned upon the formal consent of states, which 
is precisely calibrated and can even be suspended or withdrawn if 
compliance is no longer in their interest.  This aspect of treaty design 
is decidedly unlike constitutions, which articulate rules that apply 
with equal force to all similarly situated individuals and which 
generally do not envision the possibility of unilateral withdrawal by 
specific domestic polities.  Yet, the fact that treaties are sometimes 
used to tie the hands of domestic political actors and that states 
invoke exit clauses only rarely suggests that international 
cooperation is not simply an illusion and that it is possible to draw 
appropriately limited parallels between international governance 
structures and constitutions. 
VII.  EMERGING CHALLENGES:  DEMOCRACY AND LEGITIMACY 
International organizations that are weak or simply mirror 
domestic political preferences often go unnoticed or at least 
unchallenged.  But when these entities regulate subjects at the core of 
 
 132. See Rosendorff & Milner, supra note 123, at 845–52; Alan O. Sykes, 
Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape 
Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 297 (1991).  
See also Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law—Legitimacy, 
Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1555, 1583 (1999) (“[H]ow can we distinguish a nation’s principled 
assertion of a right to withdraw from a relationship that has turned out badly 
from an opportunistic attempt to appropriate benefits that were created for a 
collective good?”). 
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national law and policy, critics begin to question their authority and 
the anti-democratic character of their actions.133  Stated another way, 
it is precisely when international agreements and institutions start to 
matter that challenges to their democratic pedigree and legitimacy 
become more prevalent and more trenchant. 
The potential for a nexus to constitutional law should be 
obvious.  Democracy and legitimacy concerns are the bread and 
butter of constitutional discourse.  The specific mechanisms for 
addressing these concerns may differ from country to country and 
from constitution to constitution.  But the common thread that 
connects the creators and interpreters of constitutions in different 
jurisdictions is the need to resolve questions of power and 
governance.  These questions include deciding what procedures 
elected or representative institutions must use to create binding rules 
of general applicability, how those institutions are held accountable 
for their actions to the relevant political communities, questions of 
delegation and separation of powers, and when normal rules of 
majoritarian decision making should be constrained in the service of 
higher order principles and values.  In short, as democracy and 
legitimacy concerns become a more important focus of international 
governance, the analogies to domestic constitutions acquire greater 
allure. 
The literature on democracy and legitimacy-based critiques of 
treaties and institutions is rich and extensive, and, not surprisingly, 
focuses mainly on the EU and WTO.  Commentators analyzing these 
two institutions and predicting the future of other international 
bodies have identified several overlapping strands of democratic 
difficulties, each of which generates a different prescription for 
 
 133. Although “legitimacy” and “democracy” are central concerns of 
constitutional law and now international law scholars, there is surprisingly 
little consensus as to their meanings.  For a detailed discussion and collection 
of alternative definitions of legitimacy, see Bodansky, supra note 10, at 600–
03.  For a helpful definition of democracy, see Keohane & Nye, supra note 30, 
at 281 (“Democracy is government by officials who are accountable to the 
majority of the people in a jurisdiction, albeit with frequent provisions for 
supermajority voting and protections for individuals and minorities.”). 
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reform.  These critiques can be roughly divided into deficiencies of 
process and deficiencies of outcome.134 
Among the more numerous process critiques, commentators 
have focused in particular on participation and transparency issues.  
From a traditional international law perspective, participation begins 
and ends with the state’s decision to ratify a treaty or become a 
member of an intergovernmental organization.  Such formalism no 
longer satisfies most critics, many of whom draw upon the core 
insight of liberal IR scholars that nation states must be disaggregated 
into their constituent parts.135  Once the state is no longer treated as a 
unitary entity, the true democratic difficulty emerges:  the attenuated 
links and diffuse connections between international institutions on 
the one hand and national elected officials and the electorate itself on 
the other.136 
Prescriptions for enhancing participation occupy a wide range of 
positions along a continuum from the incremental to the utopian, and 
separately target adjudication, treaty negotiations, and rulemaking 
functions.  In the trade context, one modest proposal seeks to open 
the doors of dispute settlement chambers (and perhaps negotiating 
halls) to input from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and 
 
 134. See Atik, supra note 28, at 453–54 (drawing this distinction).  See also 
Keohane & Nye, supra note 30, at 282 (“Democratic governments are judged 
both on the procedures they follow (inputs) and on the results they obtain 
(outputs).”); Raustialia, supra note 45, at 410 (identifying the two facets of the 
democracy problem in international law as “generativity”—meaning the 
“ability of international institutions to produce new substantive rules that 
modify or extend a given legal agreement”—and “insularity”—meaning “both 
the degree of transparency and of non-executive branch (for example, 
legislative/public) participation in the international institution and its 
decisions”). 
 135. See Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal 
Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513, 513 (1997); see also 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 240, 241 (2000) (stating that characteristics of liberal theory 
include its bottom-up view, its linking of the international and domestic 
spheres, its rendering of state-society relations as transparent, and its 
transformation of states into governments). 
 136. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 30, at 276 (noting that critics of 
intergovernmental organizations such as the WTO have challenged the “closed 
clubs indirectly linked to popular demands by long and opaque chains of 
delegation”). 
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other non-state actors.137  Further along the spectrum are efforts to 
grant private parties affected by a state’s violation of its treaty 
commitments the right to assert claims before WTO dispute 
settlement institutions which are now open only to member states.138  
Such proposals emulate the approach of other intergovernmental 
organizations and international tribunals, many of which already 
permit various forms of participation by or grant standing to 
individuals and members of civil society.139 
Other observers believe more radical reforms are required, such 
as (1) holding direct elections to newly created international 
legislatures (an institutional innovation that at present exists only in 
the EU’s European Parliament); (2) authorizing national 
parliamentarians to serve on international legislative bodies; and (3) 
granting voting or participation rights to affected private individuals 
 
 137. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Misguided Debate over NGO Participation 
in the WTO, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 433 (1998); Peter J. Spiro, New Global 
Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the “Unregulated” 
Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957 (1996). 
 138. See Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade 
Organization Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
295 (1996); Andrea K. Schneider, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: 
Individual Rights in International Trade Organizations, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 587 (1998). 
 139. With respect to participation in treaty negotiations, compare 
Convention on Biological Diversity, The Convention on Biological Diversity 
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs): Relationships and Synergies, Oct. 5, 1996, UNEP/CBD/COP/3/23 ¶ 
53, stating that NGOs “may not participate as observers or in any fashion 
whatsoever in any proceedings of . . . the WTO,” with Food or Famine— 
Three Words Will Determine Our Future: Civil Society Groups Fear a New 
Global Convention Governing the Genes of the Major Food Crops Will Not Be 
Fair, Equitable, or Comprehensive, ITDG, at http://www.ukabc.org/ 
threelitlewords.doc (“Over 400 civil society groups from 70 countries have 
lobbied the negotiators of [the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture].”).  Human rights tribunals and NAFTA chapter 11 
dispute settlement panels are just two examples of international adjudication 
mechanisms that allow individuals and firms to bring suits directly against 
states.  See, e.g., Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s 
Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37, 51–87 (2003) (reviewing 
recent case law and legitimacy challenges to NAFTA’s investor-state dispute 
settlement system); Helfer, Forum Shopping, supra note 47, at 296-301 
(reviewing UN and regional human rights petition systems). 
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and interest groups.140  These proposals have, in turn, been critiqued 
on the ground that, in the absence of any international political 
community, “the extension of domestic voting practices to the world 
scale would make little normative sense, even if it were feasible.”141 
Yet if increasing the electoral accountability of international 
institutions is not a viable option, what alternatives remain?  For 
some, the critical issue is enhancing transparency.  Here, too, 
proposals range widely, from opening closed judicial and lawmaking 
venues, to granting observer status to intergovernmental 
organizations, NGOs, and other private parties, to soliciting public 
comment on institutional activities, and to publishing documents and 
studies on the internet.142 
 
 140. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, From ‘Negative’ to ‘Positive’ 
Integration in the WTO: Time for ‘Mainstreaming Human Rights’ into WTO 
Law?, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1363, 1373 (2000) (proposing the 
establishment of an advisory WTO Economic and Social Committee composed 
of civil society representatives and an advisory “parliamentary body”); Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, 17 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 398, 431 (1997) (calling for national legislatures and 
civil society groups to seek a new initiative within the WTO to strengthen 
individual rights, constitutional safeguards and more representative 
institutions); see also Atik, supra note 28, at 468–71 (reviewing proposals for 
broadening participation in decision making of intergovernmental 
organizations). 
 141. Keohane & Nye, supra note 30, at 283.  The truth of this insight is 
buttressed by the failed attempt to hold global, online elections for the public 
board members of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), a private, non-national regulatory body.  See Laurence R. Helfer, 
International Dispute Settlement at the Trademark-Domain Name Interface, 29 
PEPP. L. REV. 87, 98 (2001) (asserting that is premature to consider ICANN 
“as anything even approaching a global cyberspace parliament, given the many 
challenges to its legitimacy . . . and the paucity of voters in recent elections to 
the ICANN Board”). 
 142. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 30, at 277–78 (reviewing proposals); 
Stein, supra note 3, at 531–34 (reviewing proposals).  There is good reason to 
question whether the use of digital media to make documents publicly 
available or even to allow direct public commentary is sufficient, in itself, to 
provide a plurality of views to international lawmakers or to avoid the capture 
of the lawmaking process by special interests.  See Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra 
note 46, at 169 nn.85–87 (stating that “formal transparency in theory cannot 
ensure broad-based participation in fact” and citing in support articles and 
position by Professor Michael Froomkin critiquing online public consultations 
held by the World Intellectual Property Organization concerning the creation 
HELFER_PRINTER READY (022804) 8/2/2004  3:08 PM 
236 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:193 
 
Increased transparency has dangers as well as benefits, however.  
It is often the closed nature of the proceedings that enables 
government officials to make the tradeoffs necessary to conclude 
treaty negotiations or allows litigating parties to reach a mutually 
satisfactory settlement.  The effect of greater openness may, 
paradoxically, be a diminution in the efficacy of international 
cooperation or adjudication, a result that exacerbates a different type 
of democracy and legitimacy challenge to treaties and 
intergovernmental organizations. 
Commentators who stress the latter type of shortcoming target 
their criticism at the outcomes of international lawmaking and 
dispute settlement—that is, at deficiencies in the principles, norms, 
or rules that international regimes generate.  In some cases, the 
problem is one of ineffectiveness—an institution that has not 
achieved the goals set forth in its founding charter or established by 
its member states.  In other instances, the difficulty is one of proper 
balance, with one institution or another said to be biased in favor of 
particular substantive values.143 
Strategies for ameliorating these substantive democracy deficits 
raise considerable challenges.  On the one hand, achieving greater 
efficacy may require granting additional authority to international 
institutions and their staff, a result that would be anathema to states 
that jealously guard their sovereignty.  Yet in the absence of such 
independent authority, it may be difficult or impossible to begin the 
slow process of modifying the preferences of national actors that 
deeper international cooperation often requires.  Resolving problems 
of actual or perceived institutional bias are equally challenging.  One 
might seek to dilute normative partiality by directing reforms at a 
single influential organization, such as by altering the mix of 
expertise possessed by its bureaucrats or by expanding its 
competence to address a broader range of substantive issue areas (as 
discussed in connection with the WTO above).  A very different 
response would seek to enhance the powers of those 
 
of a new non-national dispute settlement system to resolve cybersquatting 
claims between trademark owners and domain name registrants). 
 143. See Frank J. Garcia, Building a Just Trade Order for a New 
Millennium, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1015, 1059 (2000); Philip M. 
Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 658, 709–18 (1996). 
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intergovernmental organizations whose principles, norms, or rules 
are being trenched upon by more powerful rival institutions.  Yet 
whether states will agree to cede to such organizations the authority 
that such a strategy requires remains a contentious and unresolved 
question. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has provided a brief exploration of nascent 
analogies between domestic constitutions and the international legal 
system, identifying institutions and issue areas for which 
constitutional analogies have greater salience, and comparing them 
to those for which such analogies have less purchase.  The Article 
has also examined constitutional trends that are beginning to emerge 
outside of the nation state by focusing on five structural and systemic 
challenges that the international legal system now faces.  Although 
the analogies between domestic constitutions and treaty regimes are 
inexact, they may nevertheless help to generate insights for 
international legal scholars and political scientists seeking to explain 
recent changes to international law and institutions and to predict 
their future trajectories. 
Scholars considering the next phase in this project should 
undertake more fine-grained comparisons of specific institutions or 
issues areas in which constitutional analogies seem to hold the most 
promise for enhancing international cooperation.  Although the 
translation of legal norms from one system to another is often fraught 
with danger,144 careful comparative analysis may help state and 
nonstate actors operating within international regimes to learn from 
national constitutional experiences, adapting or even enhancing their 
benefits while avoiding their mistakes. 
 
 
 144. See generally Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in International 
Copyright: Some Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199 (1994). 
